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EVIDENCE REFORM: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS LEADS THE WAY
By KENNETH CULP DAvis*
H ARBINGER of the coming judicial imitation of the administra-
tive system of evidence is the reasoning of a federal district
court in a recent decision: "It is difficult to imagine any satisfactory
ground for deciding that evidence which is admissible before the
Federal Trade Commission is inadmissible before a judge sitting
without a jury in a civil anti-trust case brought by the Govern-
ment."'
The fact is, despite the seeming custom of lawyers to make the
opposite assumption, that far more adjudications are now con-
ducted in the United States without the exclusionary rules of evi-
dence than with them.2 Administrative experience is proving the
*Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; appointed Professor
of Law, University of Minnesota, effective September, 1950.
1. Wyzanski, J., in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
89 F. Supp. 349, 356 (D. Mass. 1950). The court also reasoned that many con-
troversies are being removed from courts to agencies and that "To preserve
their own jurisdiction the courts must in this type of controversy relax the
rigidity of the hearsay rule." The court accordingly admitted a large amount
of documentary evidence although substantial portions of it were hearsay.
The court required, however, that the evidence must be "of the kind that
usually affects fair-minded men in the conduct of their more important affairs."
2. Probably the comparison should be between jury cases in court and
administrative adjudications, counting nonjury court cases on neither side.
In the federal courts during the year ending June 30, 1949, the total
number of civil cases was 37,991. Only 3,632 were contested, of which 3,231
were nonjury cases, and 172 were either directed verdicts or other disposi-
tions without verdicts. In only 1,155 did judgments rest on jury verdicts.
The total number of criminal defendants in the federal courts during the
year was 36,264. Pleas of guilty or nolo contendre were entered by 30,447.
615 were acquitted by juries and 295 by courts; 998 were convicted by juries
and 629 by courts.
In criminal and civil cases combined, dispositions of contested cases byjury verdicts were 2,768; by courts without juries, 4,255.
The figures are from Ann. Rep., Director of Admin. Office of U. S.
Courts 136, 164 (1949).
During the same year the section of complaints of the Bureau of Motor
Carriers of the ICC held 2,564 hearings. 62 ICC Ann. Rep. 105 (1949).
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soundness of dispensing with the exclusionary rules. Simplicity
and common sense take the place of intricacy and artificiality. The
fundamental tendencies are (1) to replace rules with discretion,
(2) to admit all evidence that seems relevant and useful, and (3)
to rely in making findings upon "the kind of evidence on which
responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs."
'3
In the federal administrative process and in that of many states
the exclusionary rules are discarded not only in determining what
evidence shall be admitted but also in determining what evidence
may support a finding.4 The welcome consequence of the system's
success is that, apart from official notice,5 problems of evidence
in the administrative process are of steadily diminishing import-
ance; attention is directed to probative weight of evidence and not
to issues of admission or exclusion.
DISSATISFACTION WITH ExcLusIoNARY RULES
EvEN FOR JURY CASES
Morgan and Maguire, looking backvard and forward at evi-
dence, proclaim:
In short there is scarcely a segment of the subject which does
not call for re-examination and revisiorL What is needed is a well-
designed and well-constructed code built upon the two leading prin-
ciples, enunciated by Thayer more than forty years ago, "(1) that
nothing is to be received which is not logically probative of some
matter requiring to be proved; and (2) that everything which is
thus probative should come in, unless a clear ground of policy or
law excludes it." ',
Wigmore discusses open-mindedly the "Faults and Needs of the
Rules of Evidence" and, among his pros and cons, asserts that
"in the United States and today, justice can be done without the
orthodox rules of Evidence. . .," and that "... the rules to a large
extent fail of their professed purpose. They serve, not as needful
tools for helping the truth at trials, but as game-rules, afterwards,
for setting aside the verdict."'7 The Commonwealth Fund Com-
mittee observes that "Reformers from Bentham to Wigmore have
3. Quoted from Judge Learned Hand in NLRB v. Remington Rand,
94 F. 2d 862, 873 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 576, 585 (1938).
4. An exception is the NLRB under a special provision of the Taft-
Hartley Act.
5. The difficult problems of the administrative counterpart of judicial
notice are of increasing importance. The writer has discussed these problems
comprehensively in Official Notice, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1949).
6. Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence,
50 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 922-23 (1937).
7. 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 8c (3d ed. 1940).
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exposed the illogicalities and inconsistencies . . . [of the exclu-
sionary rules] in language of biting sarcasm, stinging ridicule and
blistering denunciation . . .,"I' discusses seriously "the suggestion
of a single reform, namely, to abolish all rules which forbid the
reception of any relevant evidence . . .,"' and brings in recom-
mendations for basic changes. McCormick thoughtfully predicts
"that the hard rules of exclusion will soften into standards of dis-
cretion to exclude. But evolution will not halt there. Manifestly, the
next stage is to abandon the system of exclusion. Ordinarily it
would be more economical of time and energy, in a judge-tried
case, for the judge to receive all the relevant data offered and to
consider its reliability, not upon an artificial issue of admission or
exclusion, but only at the later stage of weighing all the evidence
as a prelude to final decision." 10 The American Bar Association's
Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence, with its
sixty-six advisers, recommends sweeping changes. 1
Most significant of all, the American Law Institute, instead of
restating the law of evidence, has adopted a Model Code which is
proposed for legislative enactment. In the Foreword of that Code
the observation is made that "the law of evidence is now where the
law of forms of action and common law pleading was in the early
part of the nineteenth century,"'12 and that "the present law as to
hearsay is a conglomeration of inconsistencies due to the application
of competing theories haphazardly applied . . . and no amount of
discourse about the frailties of jurors or the virtues of cross-
examination can give them the appearance of rationality."1 3 Pro-
fessor Morgan, the Institute's reporter for drafting the Code, has
elsewhere explained that "the Institute did not attempt a restate-
ment of the law of evidence because its members were convinced
that no restatement could eliminate the obstructions to intelligent'
investigation which currently accepted doctrines have erected."' 4
The courts themselves have often expressed dissatisfaction with
the exclusionary rules, not merely for administrative proceedings
and for nonjury cases, but for jury cases as ,well. For instance,
8. Commonwealth Fund Committee, Evidence xiv (1927).
9. Id. at xi.
10. McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A. B. A. J. 507, 580-
81 (1938).
11. 63 A. B. A. Rep. 570 (1938).
12. A. L. I., Model Code of Evidence 5 (1942). The Foreword was
written by Professor E. M. Morgan.
13. Id. at 46-47.
14. Practicing Law Institute, Significant Developments in the Law
During the War Years, Evidence 1 (1946).
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after an examiner for the FTC had excluded certain evidence, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said in 1945:
If the case was to be tried with strictness, the examiner was
right .... Why either he or the Commission's attorney should have
thought it desirable to be so formal about the admission of evidence,
we cannot understand. Even in criminal trials to a jury it is better,
nine times out of ten, to admit, than to exclude, evidence and in
such proceedings as these the only conceivable interest that can
suffer by admitting any evidence is the time lost, which is seldom
as much as that inevitably lost by idle bickering about irrelevancy
or incompetence. In the case at bar it chances that no injustice was
done, but we take this occasion to point out the danger always in-
volved in conducting such a proceeding in such a spirit, and the
absence of any advantage in depriving either the Commission or
ourselves of all evidence which can conceivably throw any light up-
on the controversy. 15 (Italics supplied.)
This judicial pronouncement takes on additional significance in
view of the court's acknowledgment that "this testimony was not
relevant to the issue.""
JUDICIAL PRACTICES IN NONJURY CASES
To the extent that the administrative process should draw from
judicial experience in working out evidence practices, it should
look to nonjury cases, not to jury cases. The dominant influence
of the jury upon the content of many of the exclusionary rules
seems abundantly dear."7 Basic in many rules is the idea that un-
trained jurors should not be exposed to relevant but possibly mis-
leading evidence. To protect the judge or the trained specialist to
the same extent as the untrained juror is palpably unsound.
Leading commentators have recognized this. Thayer, for ex-
ample, called the law of evidence "a piece of illogical, but by no
means irrational, patchwork; not at all to be admired, nor easily
to be found intelligible, except as a product of the jury system
15. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F. 2d 378, 380 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U. S. 734 (1945).
16. Ibid.
17. Among evidence scholars, Professor Morgan is a lone dissenter
from the above observation: "It would more nearly approximate the truth to
say that the hearsay rule is the child of the adversary system, and that the jury
is a foster parent foisted upon it by the judges and text-writers of the nine-
teenth century." Morgan, Some Observations Concerning a Model Code of
Evidence, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 145, 157 (1940). But even if the view of
Professor Morgan is fully accepted, the orgiins of centuries ago are of little
consequence as compared with the reasons of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries for keeping the hearsay rule and other exclusionary rules. The
modern differentiation between jury and nonjury cases is overwhelming, as
Professor Morgan agrees.
[Vol. 34:581
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.. .,,1W Wigmore, after quoting some comments of Sir Henry Maine
to the effect that the "system of technical rules .. fails .. when-
ever the arbiter of facts ... has special qualifications for deciding
on them," declares: "These sagacious observations of Sir Henry
Maine may serve to warn us that any attempt to apply strictly the
jury-trial rules of Evidence to an administrative tribunal acting
without a jury is an historical anomaly, predestined to probable
futility and failure.""' Even more emphatic is Dean M1cCormick's
observation: "As rules they are absurdly inappropriate to any
tribunal or proceeding where there is no jury. 20
Of course, practitioners are generally aware of the relaxation
or rejection of the exclusionary rules in equity cases and in law
cases in which a jury is waived.2' Appellate courts not only pre-
sume that the trial judge who admits incompetent evidence con-
siders only what is competent, but appellate courts often do all
they can to encourage trial judges to admit all relevant evidence
18. Thayer, Evidence 509 (1898).
19. 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 4b (3d ed. 1940).
20. 5 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 637, 644 (1931). See also Report of the Com-
mittee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence, 63 A. B. A. Rep. 570, 594
(1938); Commonwealth Fund Committee, Evidence xi. (1927). Of course,
not all the rules of evidence stem from the jury system, and these broad
statements have principally in view such exclusionary rules as the hearsay
rule, the opinion rule, and the best evidence rule. Privileges, oaths, cross-
examination, presumptions, judicial notice, and many other cQncepts have
no necessary relation to juries.
21. See, e.g., McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A. B. A. 3.
507, 508 (1938). "In trials without a jury the tendency is to disregard them
[the evidence rules] altogether except as the traditional rules have in-
fluenced the habitual forms of questioning, and except for rare instances
where the admission or exclusion of some indispensable item of proof will be
decisive of the entire case as for example, the testimony of a surviving party
who alone knows the facts, in an action involving the estate of a decedent.
Even if objections are made the trial judge will usually admit the evidence,
and may rely upon the gracious presumption obtaining in the appellate court
that if there was competent evidence to sustain his conclusions, he acted upon
this and discarded the incompetent. [Citing authorities.]"
Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "all
evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the
United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts
of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of
evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the
United States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors
the reception of the evidence governs." Since the authorities concerning equity
practice were sparse and unclear, opportunity was given to the courts to
reject the exclusionary rules. But when issues of evidence have become drawn
so that opinions have been written, the exclusionary rules have generally been
held applicable. Majestic v. Louisville & N. R. R., 147 F. 2d 621 (6th Cir.
1945) ; Roth v. Swanson, 145 F. 2d 262 (8th Cir. 1944). See the collection
of authorities in Note, 46 Col. L. Rev. 267, 271 (1946). An exception is
Peoples Loan & Investment Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 151 F. 2d 437 (8th
Cir. 1945). But formal opinions of appellate courts do not control the prac-
tice of trial judges, who often admit evidence, reserving judgment on the
question whether it should be considered or given weight.
1950]
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and even all evidence of doubtful relevancy. A good example is a
1950 opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in a
case coming up from the Tax Court:
In the trial of a nonjury case, it is virtually impossible for a
trial judge to commit reversible error by receiving incompetent
evidence, whether objected to or not. An appellate court will not
reverse a judgment in a nonjury case because of the admission of
incompetent evidence, unless all of the competent evidence is in-
sufficient to support the judgment or unless it affirmatively ap-
pears that the incompetent evidence induced the court to make an
essential finding which would not otherwise have been made.
[Citing cases.] On the other hand, a trial judge who, in the trial
of a nonjury case, attempts to make strict rulings on the admis-
sibility of evidence, can easily get his decision reversed . . . The
instant case is almost a perfect example of how technical rulings
on evidence will frequently frustrate the trial of a nonjury case
and put the litigants to the trouble and expense of a new trial.2 2
The court quoted with approval from an earlier opinion:
One who is capable of ruling accurately upon the admissibility
of evidence is equally capable of sifting it accurately after it has
been received, and, since he will base his findings upon the evidence
which he regards* as competent, material and convincing, he cannot
be injured by the presence in the record of testimony which he does
not consider competent or material. . . . If the record on review
contains not only all evidence which was clearly admissible, but also
all evidence of doubtful admissibility, the court which is called
upon to review the case can usually make an end of it, whereas if
evidence was excluded which that court regards as having been
admissible, a new trial or rehearing cannot be avoided.23
THE BACKGROUND OF OPINION SUPPORTING
AD~MINISTRATIVE PRACTICES
As early as 1904 the Supreme Court clearly saw the need for
allowing the ICC to avoid the use of the exclusionary rules:
The inquiry of a board of the character of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission should not be too narrowly constrained by tech-
22. Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F. 2d 377, 379 (8th Cir.
1950).
23. Donnelly Garment Co. v. NLRB, 123 F. 2d 215, 224 (8th Cir. 1942).
The court also expressed its views on the question of convenience: "We think
that experience has demonstrated that in a trial or hearing where no jury is
present, more time is ordinarily lost in listening to arguments as to the
admissibility of evidence and in considering offers of proof than would be
consumed in taking the evidence proffered, and that, even if the trier of
facts, by making close rulings upon the admissibility of evidence, does save
himself some time, that saving will be more than offset by the time con-
sumed by the reviewing court in considering the propriety of his rulings and
by the consequent delay in the final determination of the controversy." Ibid.
[Vol. 34:581
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nical rules as to admissibility of proof. Its function is largely one of
investigation, and it should not be hampered in making inquiry
pertaining to interstate commerce by those narrow rules which
prevail in trials at common law...24
In 1920 an order of the ICC was challenged because it was based
partly on hearsay, but the Court pointed out that "Even in a court
of law, if evidence of this kind is admitted without objection, it is
to be considered, and accorded its natural probative effect .... ,_25
By 1941 the Court in upholding an order resting partly on hear-
say had ample support for its observation that "it has long been
settled that the technical rules for the exclusion of evidence ap-
plicable in jury trials do not apply to proceedings before federal
administrative agencies in the absence of a statutory requirement
that such rules are to be observed."2 6
The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Proce-
dure, using mild words, aimed a devastating blow at the exclu-
sionary rules: "An administrative agency must serve a dual pur-
pose in each case: It must decide the case correctly as between the
litigants before it, and it must also decide the case correctly so as
to serve the public interest which if is charged with protecting.
This second important factor makes it necessary to keep open the
channels for the reception of all relevant evidence which will con-
tribute to an informed result. '12 7 The attitude seems to be that when
only the immediate parties are affected the exclusionary rules can't
do much harm, but when the public interest is at stake the irration-
alities of those rules cannot be allowed to hamper the process of
getting needed information! The minority of the Committee took
a much more conservative position on some other issues but minced
no words in saying that "there is no place in administrative justice
for the 'archaic and technical' rules of evidence. 2-, One of the
members of the minority has said elsewhere that the exclusionary
rules "are the product of trial by jury" and that they "should
24. ICC v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44 (1904).
25. Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 253 U. S. 117, 130 (1920). Com-
pare Morgan. The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 481, 541
(1946) : "The exclusion of hearsay evidence is not grounded upon its lack
of probative value, for if inadmissible hearsay is received without objection,
it is to be weighed by the trier of fact, and may be of sufficient value to sup-
port a finding or verdict."
26. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 155 (1941). The
court not only approved admission of the hearsay but also approved the
Administrator's reliance on it.
27. Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc. 70 (1941).
28. Id. at 241.
1950]1
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have no application before permanent administrative tribunals."2 0
Another member of the minority, speaking not merely of admissi-
bility but of basing findings upon incompetent evidence, has ex-
pressed doubts about a provision of the Model State Administra-
tive Procedure Act that findings must be supported by competent
evidence.3" To the extent that some division of opinion may still
be found, the split seems not to be along the usual liberal-conserva-
tive lines but is between special students of the subject, who uni-
formly tend toward abandonment or drastic modification of the
exclusionary rules, and the general practitioners, who often prefer
the system they find familiar.
Of course, the key to the present admiflistrative practice is sec-
tion 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act:
' . . Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but
every agency shall as a matter of policy. provide for the exclusion
of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence and no
sanction shall be imposed or rule or order be issued except upon
consideration of the whole record or such portions thereof as may
be cited by any party and as supported by and in accordance with
the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence....
This provision rejects the exclusionary rules with respect to both
admissibility and support for findings.31 The provision for exclu-
sion reaches "irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evi-
dence" and does not reach incompetent evidence. Orders and rules
need not be based upon competent evidence but must be based on
"reliable, probative and substantial evidence." The Senate Com-
mittee cited cases to show that the provision was merely a codifica-
tion of previous law,32 and said that "the standards and principles
of probity and reliability" are those "which people engaged in the
conduct of responsible affairs instinctively understand and act
upon. 3 3
29. Vanderbilt, The Technique of Proof Before Administratve Bodies,
24 Iowa L. Rev. 464, 467 (1939).
30. Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 Iowa
L. Rev. 196, 208 (1948). Referring to the requirement that an order be sup-
ported by "competent" evidence, Dean Stason says: "The wisdom and
utility of the requirement are questionable."
31. 60 Stat. 237, 5 U. S. C. § 1001 (1946) (Fed. Administrative Proce-
dure Act § 7(c)).
32. Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946). The committee
may have been guilty of overstatement when it said that the exclusionary
rules "are no longer applicable in judicial trials, at least in trials in equity
or before a court sitting without a jury." Ibid.
33. Id. at 208. The House committee made a similar statement. Id. at 270.
The House committee added: "These requirements do not preclude the ad-
mission of or reliance upon technical reports, surveys, analyses, and sum-
[Vol. 34:581
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QUESTIONS OF ADMISSIBILITY
The APA provides that "Any oral or documentary evidence
may be received.. ." The only explicit qualification is that "every
agency. shall as a matter of policy provide for the exclusion of
irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. . . ." Does
this leave an agency free to exclude incompetent evidence if it
chooses to do so?
A typical rule pursuant to the Act's provision is that of the
FPC:
In any proceeding before the Commission or a presiding officer
relevant and material evidence shall be admissible, but there shall
be excluded such evidence as is unduly repetitious or cumulative,
or such evidence as is not of the kind which would affect reasonable
and fair-minded men in the conduct of their daily affairs.3"
This rule seems to be entirely in accord with the spirit of the Act
and with the previous case law. But not all agencies have adopted
comparable rules. For instance, the FTC provides by rule: "The
trial examiner . . . shall admit relevant, material and competent
evidence, but shall exclude irrelevant, immaterial and unduly repeti-
tious evidence." 35 The rule seems deliberately to dodge the crucial
question, for it fails to provide either for admission or for exclusion
of incompetent evidence. Similarly, the ICC rule is more restricted
than the Act's provision:
Any evidence which would be admissible under the general
statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence govern-
ing proceedings in matters not involving trial by jury in the courts
of the United States, shall be admissible in hearings before the
Commission. The rules of evidence shall be applied in any proceed-
ing to the end that needful and proper evidence shall be con-
veniently, inexpensively, and speedily produced, while preserving
the substantial rights of the parties.
36
maries where appropriate to the subject matter." Ibid.
In view of the clarity of the Act's words and of the committee reports,
Senator McCarran may have been mistaken in the following colloquy:
"Mr. GEORGE. Take the labor-relations cases. Senators are familiar
with them. The circuit courts have frequently complained against what the
Labor Relations Board did, but have said, 'We are powerless to interfere
with it.' Would this bill change that rule, if the court were of the opinion that
there was no probative evidence?
"Mr. McCARRAN. Yes; it would change that rule.
"Mr. GEORGE. I am pleased to hear it." Id. at 322.
34. 18 Code Fed. Regs. § 1.26 (1949) (FPC Rules of Practice).
35. 16 Code Fed. Regs. § 2.18 (1949) (FTC Rules of Practice). Of
course the NLRB rules follow the special provision of the Taft-Hartley Act
on evidence. 29 Code Fed. Regs. § 102.39 (1949) (NLRB Rules of Practice).
36. ICC Rules of Prac., Rule 75 (1942). Why the ICC did not adopt
a provision like that of the FPC is unexplained, except for the fact that the
ICC rule was adopted in 1942 and has not been changed.
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Theoretically the exclusion of incompetent evidence, if it is the
kind of evidence on which "responsible persons are accustomed to
rely in serious affairs," might be reversible error. Of course, the
agencies seldom exclude such evidence and even when they do a
court is unlikely to set aside an order on this ground. A close
approach to such a result nevertheless appears in NLRB v. Cities
Service Oil Co.37 The examiner excluded testimony of a witness
who had made no personal investigation but who "talked with other
persons, some of whom he could not name, and accepted their re-
ports."38 The court said: "Respondent's counsel admits that the
evidence is hearsay, and, while the Board is entirely free to accept
such evidence, we cannot say that it commits reversible error in
excluding it. As the Board's able counsel admitted at the oral
argument, it probably should have been admitted, but we agree
with him that its exclusion was not fatal.... The testimony would
probably have added little .... It should be noted that the respon-
dent made no effort to put on the stand as witnesses any of the
persons who made the investigations. . . ...' In NLRB v. Ohio
Calcium Co.,40 hearsay was admitted but not relied upon and the
court seems to hold that the hearsay should have been relied upon.
The company had refused reinstatement of forty employees after
a strike, and the NLRB ordered thirty-nine reinstated. The ques-
tion was whether they had engaged in violence. The evidence
showed that ten had rocks in their hands and that ten others were
in the picket line while rocks were being thrown. The Board had
disregarded the testimony of the company's president that he had
personal knowledge of violence on the part of some strikers "and
also the reliable information he said he had received as to the con-
duct of all the others except one." 4' 1 The court gave great weight to
the failure of the Board to call sixteen of the strikers as witnesses,
and said: "There being nothing improbable about the testimony of
[the president] and it being substantially supported by other evi-
dence, there is no legal justification for its rejection .... It will thus
be seen from the uncontradicted evidence in the record that with
the exception of one employee ordered reinstated with pay, all
others engaged in acts of violence or aided and abetted others in
such conduct. '42 Apparently the court thought it was error to
37. 129 F. 2d 933 (2d Cir. 1942).
38. Id. at 936.
39. Ibid.
40. 133 F. 2d 721 (6th Cir. 1943).
41. Id. at 727.
42. Ibid.
[Vol. 34:581
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refuse to rely upon the president's testimony as to "the reliable
information he said he had received," because his personal knowl-
edge apparently did not extend to all the employees but one.
Evidence is sometimes erroneously excluded as irrelevant.43
Frequently a reviewing court's reversal of an agency's exclusion
of evidence for irrelevancy results from the reviewing court's dif-
ferent view on a question of substantive law on which relevancy
depends.
4
1
Despite the APA, some exclusions of relevant and probative
evidence may be necessary and desirable. To the extent that the
privilege against self-incrimination has a constitutional base, it is
applicable to an administrative proceeding as much as to a judicial
proceeding. Similarly, the attorney-client privilege" and perhaps
other such privileges, theoretically founded on special considera-
tions of social policy, may deserve as much respect from a court as
from an agency. For instance, if an offer in compromise enjoys a
privilege in court, it probably should enjoy an equal privilege in
the administrative process. Yet to the extent that privileges of this
kind may be regarded as unsound,4 the APA offers opportunity
for the administrative process to experiment with a system which
differs from that followed by courts.
43. NLRB v. Fairchild E. & A. Corp., 145 F. 2d 214 (4th Cir. 1944);
Fresh Grown Preserve Corp. v. FTC, 125 F. 2d 917 (2d Cir. 1942).
In Associated Laboratories v. FTC, 150 F. 2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1945),
the court said "it is perfectly plain that the evidence was in fact irrelevant"
but nevertheless cautioned examiners and agencies against exclusion of evi-
dence of doubtful relevance.
44. An especially good example of this is American Trucking Associa-
tions v. United States, 326 If. S. 77 (1945).
45. In SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 (D.C. 1948), the court as-
sumed that the attorney-client privilege was the same for a proceeding be-
fore the SEC as for a proceeding in court.
46. See McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidcnce, 24 A. B. A. J. 507,
512 (1938), for the view that such privileges as that of husband and wife,
and attorney and client are supposed to rest on public interest in keeping
such secrets inviolate, that "the fostering effect must be slight," and that
the privileges have survived because revealing of confidences is regarded
as dishonorable but that "it would not be dishonorable if the law required it."
Maguire, Evidence-Common Sense and Common Law 164 (1947): "En-
forcement of patient-physician privilege in an industrial accident tribunal
is nonsense, obvious and complete." Morgan, Some Observations Concerning
a Model Code of Ezidence, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 145, 153 (1940) : "A scien-
tific code of evidence would, therefore, erect no privilege for communica-
tions between client and attorney . . . But there is no hope of securing the
adoption of such a provision." McCormick, Privilege in the Law of Evidence,
16 Tex. L. Rev. 447, 469 (1938) : "The manifest destiny of evidence law is a
progressive lowering of the barriers to truth. Seeing this tendency, the
commentators who take a wide view, whether from the bench, the bar, or the
schools, seem generally to advocate a narrowing of the field of privilege."
1950]
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WREN IS INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE RELIABLE, PROBATIVE,
AND SUBSTANTIAL?
More than nine-tenths of the problems of exclusionary rules that
come to reviewing courts from the agencies involve administrative
reliance on hearsay in making findings. The case law on the mean-
ing of the APA's words "reliable, probative, and substantial" is
slow to develop, but since the legislative history shows clear intent
to codify previous law,47 presumably the question is governed by
pre-APA case law.
Following the lead of the New York Court of Appeals in Mat-
ter of Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.,4 s some of the state courts40
have developed the "residuum" rule-that even when a statute pro-
vides that an agency is not bound by the rules of evidence, and
even though the agency "may in its discretion accept any evidence
that is offered; still in the end there must be a residuum of legal
evidence to support the claim before an award can be made.""0 The
New York Court of Appeals more recently has retreated to some
extent from the rule,"' but it apparently persists in other states,
and recently the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have
47. See note 32 supra.
48. 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507 (1916).
49. E.g., Consumers Co. v. Industrial Commission, 364 Ill. 145, 4 N. E.
2d 34 (1936) ; Gacesa v. Consumers Power Co., 220 Mich. 338, 190 N. W.
675 (1922) ; Lloyd-McAlpine Logging Co. v. Whitefish, 188 Wis. 642, 206
N. W. 914 (1926).
50. Matter of Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435, 440,
113 N. E. 507, 509 (1916).
Wig-more rejects the residuum rule because (1) "it still virtually re-
quires the tribunal to test its proceedings by the jury-trial rules, and thus
holds out the temptation to practitioners to employ the whole arsenal of
technical weapons and secure a record full of 'errors,'" and (2) it rests
logically on the fallacy that the residuum of legal evidence will have some
necessary relation to the truth, whereas "the 'legal' rules have no such neces-
sary relation." 1 Wigmore, Evidence 40-41 (3d ed. 1940). Commissioner
Benjamin likewise rejected the residuum rule. Administrative Adjudication in
the State of New York 192 (1942).
51. Altschuller v. Bressler, 289 N. Y. 463, 46 N. E. 2d 886 (1943).
The legislature changed the statute after the Carroll case so as to permit re-
liance on hearsay statements of a deceased employee. The court in the
Altschuller case upheld an award based on hearsay statements of an em-
ployee who was mentally dead but physically alive. The principal basis for
the decision was that "there is no substantial testimony to show that an
accident did not occur as narrated by the injured employee, and established
'facts and circumstances' leave little reasonable doubt that the narration is
substantially true." Id. at 470, 46 N. E. 2d at 889.
Some state cases hold that hearsay may support a finding. American
Furniture Co. v. Graves, 141 Va. 1, 15-16, 126 S. E. 213, 216-17 (1925) ;
London Guarantee & A. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 203 Cal.
12, 14-15, 263 Pac. 196, 197 (1927).
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adopted the residuum rule in the proposed Model State Administra-
tive Procedure ActY
The extent to which, if at all, the residuum rule is the law of the
federal courts is not easy to determine. Congress in the APA clear-
ly avoided the requirement of competent evidence to support a
finding2 3 Judge Hough in 1924 laid down the basic proposition
that has been followed in the federal courts ever since: "We are of
opinion that evidence or testimony, even though legally incom-
petent, if of the kind that usually affects fair-minded men in the
conduct of their daily and more important affairs, should be re-
ceived and considered; but it should be fairly done."' Judge
Learned Hand authoritatively stated in 1938 that the examiner
"did indeed admit much that would have been excluded at common
law, but the act specifically so provides; . . . no doubt, that does
not mean that mere rumor will serve to 'support' a finding, but
hearsay may do so, at least if more is not conveniently available, and
if in the end the finding is supported by the kind of evidence on
which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious af-
fairs.""' And Mr. Justice Rutledge declared in behalf of a court of
appeals: "It is only convincing, not lawyers' evidence which is
required.-'
But these various statements, much quoted and requoted and
followed, do not necessarily answer the main question. For it is
still arguable, as the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
said, that "responsible persons are not accustomed to rely on hear-
say in serious affairs. ' 157 Of a statutory provision that "the rules of
evidence . . . shall not be controlling," the same court had earlier
said: "WNVe think Congress presupposed that the trier of facts
would weigh and apply the evidence as before and use only that
which was competent and material, and disregard that which was
not.""is And the Fifth Circuit has held: "Hearsay and non-expert
opinion evidence may not be used in this court as a basis to sup-
52. Under section 12(7) (e) the reviewing court may reverse if the
administrative findings are "unsupported by competent, material, and sub-
s;tantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted."
53. See text at notes 31-33 supra.
54. John Bene & Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 299 F. 468, 471 (2d Cir. 1924).
55. NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F. 2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1938).
56. International Ass'n v. NLRB, 110 F. 2d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
57. Tyne Co. v. NLRB, 125 F. 2d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1942). Compare
Reck v. Whittlesberger, 181 Mich. 463, 469, 148 N. W. 247, 249 (1914):
"The rule against hearsay evidence is more than a mere artificial technicality
of law. It is founded on the experience, common knowledge, and common
conduct of mankind. Its principles are generally understood and acted upon
in any important business transaction or serious affair in life."
58. NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 119 F. 2d 356, 364 (7th Cir. 1941).
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port the findings of the Board upon which rests an order sought
to be enforced."59
Most significant is the Supreme Court's pronouncement in the
Consolidated Edison case: "Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor
does not constitute substantial evidence."'60 This statement has
been neither overruled nor specifically discredited by the Supreme
Court. Is that not a sufficient basis for a conclusion that the resi-
duum rule is at least to some extent the law of the federal courts?
The answer is probably no. The statements of Judges Hough
and Hand have survived the Consolidated Edison case, the remark
in that case is a mere dictum,6 1 and even in the face of the remark,
federal courts in their holdings have often upheld findings resting
on hearsay.
In the Opp case, 2 the Supreme Court upheld a wage order
resting on statistical studies which were largely hearsay, and the
Court said that the studies "were evidence to be considered by the
Administrator, '63 but the authority of the case is weakened by lack
of objection to admission of the evidence.6 4 In Ellers v. Railroad
Retirement Board,65 a denial of an award was based on reports,
59. NLRB v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., 98 F. 2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1938).
One of the most extreme federal decisions is Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 96 F. 2d 564, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1938), in which the FCC had allowed
an applicant for a broadcasting license to testify: "Those I talked to were
unanimously of the opinion that another station would be very beneficial, and
the majority of them promised financial support to it." The court said: "The
testimony admitted was clearly hearsay. It was a statement in effect of what
others had told [the witness]. Its admission deprived the appellant of the
right to cross-examine . . ." Of the case Wigmore said: "No wonder the
administrative agencies chafe under such unpractical control." 1 Wigmore,
Evidence 33-34 (3d ed. 1940). The case is altogether different from one
like Powhatan Mining Co. v. Ickes, 118 F. 2d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1941), in which
the right to cross-examine was of great consequence and the court held that
the statistical data could not be relied upon unless underlying facts about
its compilation were revealed.
60. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 230 (1938). The
case was decided in December, 1938. NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F. 2d 862
(2d Cir. 1938), in which Judge Learned Hand said that hearsay may support
a finding, was February, 1938.
61. Just as strong a dictum is that of Mr. Justice Brandeis for a unani-
mous Court in Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131, 133 (1924), that the correctness of
the judgment of the lower court concerning the administrative finding "is
not to be determined by enquiring whether the conclusion drawn by the
Secretary of Labor from the evidence was correct or by deciding whether
the evidence was such that, if introduced in a court of law, it would be held
legally sufficient to prove the fact found."
62. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126 (1941).
63. Id. at 155.
64. The Court cited previous holdings that if such evidence is admitted
without objection "it is to be considered and must be accorded 'its natural
probative effect as if it were in law admissible.'" Ibid.
65. 132 F. 2d 636 (2d Cir. 1943).
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answers to questionnaires, and letters not under oath; the court
upheld the order after reciting that "if it is of the kind on which
fair-minded men are accustomed to rely in serious matters, it can
support an administrative finding."6 In NLRB v. Southern Wood
P. Co. 6 7 the question was whether an employee was discharged for
union activities. The employee testified that a week after his dis-
charge, a representative of the company offered him a new job, but
when he went to take the job he found the representative talking
to the superintendent who had discharged him; the representative
then told him he had not known earlier that the employee "had
been messed up in labor trouble" and that the company could not
employ him. The superintendent testified that the discharge was
"solely for general inefficiency in his work." The court upheld a
finding that the discharge was for union activity. But the finding
rested on evidence of efficiency as well as on the hearsay. Another
such discharge case is Union Drawn Steel Co. v. NLRB.6 8 The
discharged employee testified that the foreman told him, after the
refusal to rehire at the end of a strike, that the mistake he made
was going on the picket line. The foreman testified that he said
only that the employee was too old for the picket line and that he
could have his job back when there was work for him to do. The
court said the employee's testimony was hearsay but "not remote"
and that the testimony was corroborated by the company's hostility
to the union and by the fact that the employee's place was filled
by other men. But the support for this last point was weak; the
employee was unskilled; whether three new men taken on were
skilled or unskilled did not appear in the record; and the foreman
testified that the employee's work had been done by himself and
other members of the force. The case seems to hold either that the
uncorroborated hearsay supports the finding, or that the hearsay
corroborated by the company's hostility and the other inconclusive
evidence does so; nothing hinges on which form of statement is
used, for other circumstances of a case can always be called cor-
roboration.
The kind of weak corroboration that is sometimes held sufficient
is well illustrated by a workmen's compensation case, Associated
General Contractors v. Cardillo.6 The deceased employee's rela-
tives testified he told them he had struck his head against a filing
cabinet. The statute provided that "declarations of a deceased em-
66. Id. at 639.
67. 135 F. 2d 606 (5th Cir. 1943).
68. 109 F. 2d 587 (3d Cir. 1940).
69. 106 F. 2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
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ployee concerning the injury... shall be received in evidence and
shall, if corroborated by other evidence, be sufficient to establish
the injury." The court held: "His story of how and where the
injury happened is corroborated by the facts that (1) he came
home from the office 'at his usual time,' with a visible wound and
manifestations of suffering which he had not exhibited when he
left home to go to the office, and (2) there was, in his office, a filing
case on which he could have injured himself as he said he did."TO A
somewhat similar holding is NLRB v. Service Wood Heel Co.7
The question was whether a majority of employees had chosen
the union. The only evidence that they had was 33 signed slips, but
Hutchins, who collected the slips, could testify to the genuineness
of only 12 or 14. The court accepted all 33 as evidence, declaring:
"We think there was sufficient corroboration in the testimony of
Hutchins, in a careful inspection of the slips themselves, and in the
surrounding circumstances." The court specifically rejected the
residuum rule: "If... the Board... must sift out the various items
of evidence before it and reserve for special treatment those items
which would have been inadmissible in a court of lait, under the
technical and often debatable rules of evidence, we think there
would be put upon the Board the very burden of which the Con-
gress intended to relieve it.
''72
The cases are legion in which courts uphold both the
exclusion and the deportation of aliens on the basis of
hearsay.73 The outstanding case rejecting such evidence is
70. Id. at 329.
71. 124 F. 2d 470 (lst Cir. 1941).
72. Id. at 472. Another weak-corroboration case is Meinwald v. Doran,
60 F. 2d 261 (S.D. N.Y. 1932), involving revocation of a druggist's permit.
See also Alabama v. United States, 46 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Ky. 1944). Of
course hearsay is sometimes not substantial evidence. E.g., Martel Mills
Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F. 2d 624 (4th Cir. 1940) ; Automobile Sales Co. v.
Bowles, 58 F. Supp. 469 (N.D. Ohio 1944).
73. In Yong Yung See v. United States, 92 F. 2d 700 (9th Cir. 1937) the
sole evidence against the alien was testimony in another case. The court
recognized that this was hearsay but justified the finding by saying "it is
not shown that the three witnesses . . .were available for this inquiry." In
Singh v. District Director, 96 F. 2d 969 (9th Cir. 1938), the evidence against
the alien was a letter from the Seattle immigration office and sworn state-
ments by Mexican officers identifying the alien's photograph. When the
alien asked for a chance to cross-examine, he was told he could do so by
deposition, but he did not have the money to pay for that. The deportation
order was upheld. In The Washington, 19 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. N.Y. 1937) the
evidence against the alien was a letter from an American consul.
In Vatjauer v. Commissioner, 273 U. S. 103, 106 (1927), the Court said
of a deportation order that "a want of due process is not established by
showing . . . that incompetent evidence was received and considered."
Despite the Supreme Court's recognition in Ng Fung Ho v. White, 25f
U. S. 276 (1922) that deportation, as distinguished from exclusion, ma
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Bridges v. Vixon, 74 which, however, may rest on such unique
considerations and may involve such flagrantly unsound analysis
as to be of little value as authority for future cases. Bridges chal-
lenged a deportation order by habeas corpus. The inspector had
found that he had been a member of the Communist Party, the
Board of Appeals found that he had not, and the Attorney General
had agreed with the inspector. The court of appeals, three to two,
upheld the Attorney General, and the Supreme Court, five to three,
reversed. The evidence, in addition to independent testimony of
Lundeberg identifying Bridges as a Communist, consisted of un-
signed and unsworn statements O'Neil allegedly had made to in-
vestigating officers some months earlier that O'Neil had walked into
Bridges' office in 1937 and saw Bridges pasting assessment stamps
in a Communist party book, and that Bridges reminded O'Neil
that he had not been attending party meetings. The statements were
verified by the stenographer who took them down and by an officer
who testified that O'Neil had later repeated the statements to him
and to other witnesses. O'Neil was a witness at the deportation pro-
ceeding but denied making the alleged statements. The Court
quoted Regulations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service:
All statements secured from the alien or any other person during
the investigation, which are to be used as evidence, shall be taken
down in writing; and the investigating officer shall ask the person
interrogated to sign the statement. Whenever such a recorded state-
ment is to be obtained from any person, the investigating officer
shall identify himself to such person and the interrogation of that
person shall be under oath or affirmation. Whenever a recorded
statement is to be obtained from a person under investigation, he
shall be warned that any statement made by him may be used as
evidence in any subsequent proceeding.7 A recorded statement
made by the alien (other than a General Information Form) or by
any other person during an investigation may be received in evi-
dence only if the maker of such statement is unavailable or refuses
to testify at the warrant hearing or gives testimony contradicting
the statements made during the investigation.76
The Court held that Bridges, having properly objected, was en-
result in loss of "all that makes life worth living," and therefore calls for
greater procedural safeguards than those permitted for exclusion in United
States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253 (1905), the alien cases in reviewing courts
involving questions of evidence do not seem to recognize any such line between
deportation and exclusion, with the exception of Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S.
135, 154 (1945), where the Court said: "Though deportation is not technical-
ly a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and
deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom."
74. 326 U. S. 135 (1945).
75. 8 Code Fed. Regs. § 150.1 (c) (1949) (Reg. of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Serv.).
76. Id., at § 150.6 (i).
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titled to insist upon observance of these rules: "A written state-
ment at the earlier interviews under oath and signed by O'Neil
would have afforded protection against mistakes in hearing, mistakes
in memory, mistakes in transcription. Statements made under those
conditions would have an important safeguard-the fear of prosecu-
tion for perjury. ' 77 The Court thus interpreted the Regulations as
requiring exclusion of O'Neil's unsigned and unsworn statements,
although nothing in the Regulations specifically so required. Indeed,
the Court's quotation stopped immediately short of what may be
the most significant sentence of the Regulations:
An affidavit of an inspector as to the statements made by the
alien or any other person during an investigation may be received
in evidence, otherwise than in support of the testimony of the in-
spector, only if the maker of such statement is unavailable or re-
fuses to testify at the warrant hearing or gives testimony contra-
dicting the statement and the inspector is unavailable to testify in
person . 7
Since O'Neil did give testimony contradicting the earlier statements,
this provision clearly permitted reception of the inspector's affidavit,
and yet the Court seemed to hold that even superior evidence should
be excluded-the testimony instead of the affidavit of the inspector,
and the stenographer's transcription supported by the testimony of
the stenographer. The Court did not attempt to answer the obser-
vation of the three dissenting justices that the Regulations provided
"neither explicitly nor by implication that statements other than
recorded statements are inadmissible. ' 9
The majority, however, rested its decision not only on the
Regulations but also on the hearsay character of the O'Neil state-
ments. The Court reasoned that those statements would not be
admissible in a criminal case as substantive evidence, that the hear-
say rule has been relaxed in exclusion cases but that here deporta-
tion was involved, and that "deportation is a penalty-at times a
most serious one."80 The astounding implication from this part of
the opinion seems to be that the same rules of evidence apply in a
deportation case as in a criminal case. But the majority of the
Court made no attempt to answer the point made in the dissenting
opinion, and also made by the presiding inspector in reliance on
Wigmore,1 that the principal reason for excluding hearsay is lack
77. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 153 (1945).
78. 8 Code Fed. Regs. § 150.6 (i) (1949).
79. 326 U. S. 135,175 (1945).
80. Id. at 154.
81. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 1018(b) (3d ed. 1940) : "It does not follow,
however, that Prior Self-Contradictions, when admitted, are to be treated
as having no affirmative testimonial value, and that any such credit is to be
[Vol. 34:581
EVIDENCE REFORM
of opportunity for cross-examination and that O'Neil was present
for cross-examination.
In a third respect the majority opinion takes a position that
seems untenable. The Court said: "Whether the finding would have
been made on this record from the testimony of Lundeberg alone is
wholly conjectural and highly speculative. -8 2 This statement was
unsupported by specific analysis. The dissenting justices asserted
precisely the opposite, and supported their conclusion with quo-
tations from the findings of the inspector, adopted by the Attorney
General, including the statement: "I reach the conclusion, therefore,
that the conversation did take place substantially as testified by
Lundeberg and that Bridges did then and there admit to Lundeberg
that he was a member of the Communist party."' 3
A fourth element of the majority opinion may alone be enough
to render the decision unsound. The Lundeberg testimony, although
hearsay, was probably within the admission exception to the hear-
say rule and would probably be admissible even in a criminal case.8 4
Even if the Court had been right in its view that it was conjectural
whether the finding would have been made on the Lundeberg testi-
mony alone, still that would be reason merely for remanding the
case to the finders of fact. The Court's judgment had the effect
of releasing Bridges and ending the case. Although the courts com-
monly remand deportation cases, the Court made no mention of
that possibility. 2
strictly denied them in the mind of the tribunal. The only ground for so
doing would be the Hearsay rule. But the theory of the Hearsay rule is
that an extrajudicial statement is rejected because it was made out of Court
by an absent person not subject to cross-examination .... Here, however,
by hypothesis the witness is present and subject to cross-examination....
The whole purpose of the Hearsay rule has been already satisfied."
Compare Mfaguire, Evidence-Common Sense and Common Law 59(1947) : "Since the witness is by hypothesis the author of the inconsistent
statement, and is instantly available for full cross-examination as to its
verity, the statement is not hearsay at all and should be admissible at full
value."
82. 326 U. S. 135, 155-56 (1945).
83. Id. at 172.
84. The court below passed upon the question whether the statement
was admissible as an admission and held that it was. Bridges v. Wixon, 144
F. 2d 927 (9th Cir. 1944).
85. The Court did call O'Neil's statements "highly prejudicial." Bridges
v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 154 (1945). And of those statements it said: "We
are unable to say that the order of deportation may be sustained without
them."
Lundeberg testified that he had dined at Bridges' home in 1935, that
Bridges urged him to join the Communist Party, and that two members of
Bridges' family and a secretary were present. The Lundeberg testimony
should be discounted by Lundeberg's admitted hostility to Bridges. But that
testimony takes on added weight from Bridges' failure to call as witnesses
the members of the family and the secretary.
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The combined effect of the various weaknesses of the majority
opinion is overwhelming. The infirmities seem serious enough to
weaken or destroy the authority of the case as a guide for future
cases.
8 6
OPINION EVIDENCE AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
The technical rule known as "the opinion rule" obviously does
not apply to the administrative process. A view even more liberal
than that of Wigmore8 7 and of the Model Code8 8 prevails.8
9 The
dominant spirit, even in reviewing courts, is typified by Keller v.
FTC.10 A witness whose qualifications as an expert were doubtful
had been allowed to give substantial opinion testimony. The court
disposed of the question with a simple remark: "In this situation
we think the question was not properly whether the witness was
qualified to testify but, rather, what weight was to be given to his
testimony."
Questions of expert testimony often relate peculiarly to the
administrative process, One of the most common arguments is that
an agency cannot accept the expert testimony of its own staff mem-
bers as against the testimony of outside experts; the federal courts
consistently reject the argument.91 Sometimes the agency tries to
follow the conventional rule and the reviewing court has to remind
it that the administrative process should be free from such a rule;
the Tax Court, for instance, rejected testimony of a corporate
officer as to reasonableness of salaries, applying the rule often fol-
lowed at common law that a witness may not give an opinion on the
very question the tribunal must answer, but the reviewing court
reversed.9
2
86. Compare Maguire, Evidence-Common Sense and Common Law
163 (1947) : "The view of the majority is either anomalous or strictly limited
by peculiarities of the situation in the immediate case."
87. 7 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1920-21 (3d ed. 1940).
88. Rule 401.
89. An especially helpful presentation of the judicial practices is Mc-
Cormick, Some Observations upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony,
23 Tex. L. Rev. 109 (1945).
90. 132 F. 2d 59, 61 (7th Cir. 1942).
91. NLRB v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F. 2d 713 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Pacific
Power & L. Co. v. FPC, 141 F. 2d 602 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Rabkin v. Bowles,
143 F. 2d 600 (Em. Ct. App. 1944).
92. Express Pub. Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d 386 (5th Cir. 1944).
In Carmichael v. Wong Choon Ock, 119 F. 2d 173 (9th Cir. 1941) the
court set aside a deportation order resting on medical expert testimony as to
a boy's age, where direct testimony supported the opposite finding. A part of
the basis for the court's view is revealed by Judge Denman denying petition
for rehearing, 122 F. 2d 829 (9th Cir. 1941) : "At ten years of age, because
of my size, I was excluded from footraces for boys under fourteen." But in
Kong Din Quong v. Haff, 112 F. 2d 96 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U. S.
706 (1940), medical expert testimony as to age was held enough.
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In many cases the question recurs whether a supposedly expert
tribunal may use its own judgment in the face of uncontradicted
expert testimony to the contrary. The early federal cases sometimes
required specific expert opinion to support the finding,93 but in the
1940's the federal courts have generally permitted agencies to use
their own judgment.9 4 Typical of recent cases is a remark in a
workmen's compensation case: "The Deputy Commissioner is not
bound to accept the opinion or theory of any particular medical ex-
pert but he may rely upon his own observation and judgment in
conjunction with all of the evidence before him." 9"5
Another recurring problem is whether misrepresentation of a
product may be found on the basis of general expert testimony that
no substance will do what is claimed for the product, when the
expert witnesses so testifying have not analyzed the particular
product, and when other expert witnesses have analyzed the prod-
uct and testify that it does what is claimed; the cases generally
permit a finding of misrepresentation in such circumstances96 The
key case is now Reily v. Pjnkus."7 The Postmaster General issued
a fraud order concerning "Kelp-I-Dine," represented as permitting
persons suffering from obesity to "eat plenty" and yet reduce
"without tortuous diet" and without feeling hungry. Two doctors
testified that iodine is valuless as an anti-fat, that kelp would not
reduce hunger, and that the suggested diet was too drastic to be
safe without medical supervision. The one doctor testifying for
respondent expressed opinion that iodine did have value as a fat
reducer and is so used by physicians, but even he conceded that the
daily dosage to reduce weight would be fifty to sixty times as much
as the recommended dosage, and that the recommended diet might
93. Boggs & Buhl v. Commissioner, 34 F. 2d 859 (3d Cir. 1929);Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner, 53 F. 2d 381 (2d Cir. 1931), cert.
denied, 284 U. S. 690 (1932).
94. Spitzer v. Commissioner, 153 F. 2d 967 (8th Cir. 1946) ; Kline v.Commissioner, 130 F. 2d 742 (3d Cir. 1942), ccrt. denied, 317 U. S. 697(1943) ; In re Rae's Estate, 147 F. 2d 204 (3d Cir. 1945).
95. Contractors v. Pillsbury, 150 F. 2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1945).
Of course, when background of experience is the basis for the finding, afair procedure requires that that basis be revealed to the parties at the ap-propriate stage. In this respect Moschogianis v. Concrete Material & Mfg. Co.,
179 Minn. 177, 228 N. W. 607 (1930) may be sounder than McCarthy v.Sa .ver-Goodman Co., 194 Wis. 198, 215 N. W. 824 (1927). For the officer
to refuse to take into account his special knowledge or experience would be
unfortunate; equally unfortunate is his reliance on that knowledge without
revealing it.
96. John J. Fulton Co. v. FTC, 130 F. 2d 85 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,317 U. S. 679 (1942) ; J. E. Todd, Inc. v. FTC, 145 F. 2d 858 (D.C. Cir.1944) ; Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. FTC, 143 F. 2d 676 (2d
Cir. 1944).
97. 338 U. S. 269 (1949).
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prove harmful. The district court and the court of appeals held that
mere opinion evidence could not support a fraud order, relying on
American School v. McAnnulty0 s in which the Supreme Court had
set aside a fraud order because of two widely held schools of
opinion about the representation in question and because scientific
knowledge was not yet sufficient to attribute intent to deceive to
one who asserted either opinion. The contention of the Pinkius case
was that "even the testimony of the most experienced medical ex-
perts can never rise above a mere 'opinion' unless the expert has
made actual tests of the drug to determine its effects in relation to
the particular representations alleged to be false." The Court re-
jected that contention but added a note of caution: "It would
amount to condemnation of new ideas without a trial to give the
Postmaster General power to condemn new ideas as fraudulent
solely because some cling to traditional opinions with unquestion-
ing tenacity." 99
BURDEN OF PROOF
Section 7(c) of the APA provides: "Except as statutes other-
wise provide, th& proponent of a rule or order shall have the burden
of proof." The Committee reports explained: "That the proponent
of a rule or order has the burden of proof means not only that the
party initiating the proceeding has the general burden of coming
forward with a prima facie case but that other parties, who are
proponents of some different result, also for that purpose have
a burden to maintain."'100 An example of the way the provision can
be applied, or misapplied, is Philadelphia Co. v. SEC."'0 The Public
Utility Holding Company Act empowers the SEC by rules and
regulations to exempt classes of persons from obligations imposed
by the Act upon subsidiary companies. A rule adopted prior to 1941
exempted all subsidiaries other than gas or electric utilities, invest-
ment companies, service companies, or holding companies thereof.
Under the rule the Pittsburgh Railways Company, a subsidiary
of Philadelphia Company, was exempt. When Pittsburgh filed a
voluntary petition for reorganization in bankruptcy, the SEC in-
quired into the desirability of asserting jurisdiction over Pittsburgh
under the Holding Company Act, issued a proposed amendment of
98. 187 U. S. 94 (1902). The Supreme Court had previously limited
this case in Leach v. Carlile, 258 U. S. 138 (1922).
99. Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U. S. 269, 274 (1949).
Another aspect of the decision, denial of cross-examination, is discussed
in text at notes 106-108 infra.
100. Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 208, 270 (1946).
101. 175 F. 2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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the rule, and invited written data, views, comments and oral argu-
ments. Philadelphia requested a hearing at which evidence might
be presented subject to cross-examination. The SEC denied such
a hearing, and the court held that the denial was error. The court
also held that "the Commission erroneously failed to assume the
burden of proof in respect of the propriety of its proposed action."'
10 2
The court did not attempt to explain how the Commission can
prove with evidence that such a rule should be amended in any
particular respect. The APA provision may be entirely sound be-
cause by its terms it is limited to cases of adjudication and rule-
making required by statute to be determined on the record after
opportunity for agency hearing. If the court's decision is unsound,
the fault may lie in the holding that the statute requires this kind
of rule-making to be determined on the record.
CROSS-EXAMINATION; WRITTEN PRESENTATIONS
Section 7(c) of the APA provides:
Every party shall have the right to present his case or defense by
oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to
conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and
true disclosure of the facts. In rule making or determining claims
for money or benefits or applications for initial licenses any agency
may, where the interest of any party will not be prejudiced thereby,
adopt procedures for the submission of all or part of the evidence
in written form.
The Senate committee said: "To the extent that cross-examination
is necessary to bring out the truth, the party should have it."103
The House committee said: "The provision on its face does not
confer a right of so-called 'unlimited' cross-examination. Presiding
officers will have to make the necessary initial determination
whether the cross-examination is pressed to unreasonable lengths
. ..In many rule-making proceedings where the subject matter
and evidence are broadly economic or statistical in character and
the parties or witnesses numerous, the direct or rebuttal evidence
may be of such a nature that cross-examination adds nothing
substantial to the record and unnecessarily prolongs the
hearings."' 10
4
Reliance upon hearsay, which as we have seen is usually clearly
permissible, obviously prevents cross-examination of declarants
who are unavailable. Then in what circumstances is cross-exami-
nation required for a full and true disclosure of the facts? Pow-
102. Id. at 818.
103. Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 209 (1946).
104. Id. at 271.
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hatan Mining Co. v. Ickes0 5 is helpful on this question. In fixing
coal prices, the director relied upon statistical data purporting to
show prices on various grades of coal, but the identity of the par-
ticular producers was not disclosed to the petitioners, who de-
manded that knowledge in order that they might cross-examine.
Late in the hearing the names of producers were disclosed but no
basis was provided for linking any particular name with any par-
ticular transaction. The practical effect was to deny the petitioners
an effective right of cross-examination with respect to the statistical
data. The court held that this amounted to denial of fair hearing.
In Reilly v. Pinkus,0 r discussed above in another connection, 0 7 the
Post Office Department's expert witnesses testified that "Kelp-I-
Dine" was valueless as an anti-fat and would not reduce hunger.
The doctors' opinions rested on their general professional knowl-
edge but to some extent was acquired from medical texts and publi-
cations. The seller of the product sought to cross-examine the
doctors concerning statements in other medical books, some of
which at least were shown to be respectable authorities. The books
asserted the use of kelp as a fat-reducer. The examiner did not
permit this cross-examination. The Supreme Court held: "We
think this was an undue restriction on the right to cross-examine. It
is certainly illogical, if not actually unfair, to permit witnesses to
give expert opinions based on book knowledge, and then deprive
the party challenging such evidence of all opportunity to interrogate
them about divergent opinions expressed in other reputable books."
The Court set aside the order on this ground, attempting, however,
to prevent misinterpretation of the holding by saying: "The power
to refuse enforcement of orders for error in regard to evidence
should be sparingly exercised. A large amount of discretion in the
conduct of a hearing is necessarily reposed in an administrative
agency."
Somewhere between the denials of cross-examination in such
cases as Powhatan and Pink us and the denial of cross-examination
in an ordinary instance of reliance on hearsay, a line must be
drawn to determine when cross-examination is required for a full
and true disclosure of the facts. 08 That line has to be drawn in the
first instance by hearing officers, subject to the check of agencies
105. 118 F. 2d 105 (6th Cir. 1941).
106. 338 U. S. 269 (1949).
107. Text at notes 97-99 supra.
108. See Vatjauer v. Commissioner, 273 U. S. 103, 106 (1927): "A
want of due process is not established by showing . . . that incompetent
evidence was received and considered."
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and the further check of reviewing courts.
The Act recognizes the propriety of limiting some proceedings to
written presentations, without cross-examination. The outstanding
procedure of this kind is the ICC "shortened procedure,"'1 9 which
has been used since 1923 in about a third of the railroad rate
cases,110 with a great saving to the Commission and to the parties.
In the ICC the use of the shortened procedure requires consent of
all parties, although the Department of Agriculture makes it com-
pulsory in some cases. The complainant submits a memorandum of
facts, sworn to by the persons who would appear as witnesses if
an oral hearing were conducted. An answering memorandum,
similarly sworn to, is then filed by the defendant, followed by a
reply memorandum of the complainant. Each memorandum may
be accompanied by written argument. Interveners are permitted to
file memoranda of fact with supporting arguments, and all memo-
randa are served on interveners as well as on other parties. The
examiner prepares a proposed report which is served on the par-
ties, and thereafter the procedure of briefs, exceptions, oral argu-
ments, and decision-making is the same as in cases involving oral
hearings. The key to the success of the shortened procedure is the
rarity of questions of truth or falsity in rate cases. Most rate con-
troversies revolve around questions of inference, interpretation,
discretion, and law rather than around questions of primary or
evidentiary facts. Some members of the ICC staff even believe that
the shortened procedure results in better decisions than hearing
procedures because the written memoranda are generally more
precise than oral testimony."'
Since an officer in behalf of the Commission recommends use
of the shortened procedure in about twice as many cases as the
number in which parties consent, the question is an important one
whether the ICC should exercise discretion to make the shortened
procedure compulsory in some cases. The compulsory system of
the Department of Agriculture apparently has not been successfully
challenged.
The OPA cases directly bear upon the problem of constitution-
ality of compelling the shortened procedure in appropriate cases.
The Act provided that protests against price orders and regulations
109. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc. 23-26 (ICC Monograph 1941); 3
Bull. Assoc. of Practitioners Before the ICC 9 (Aug. 1933).
110. During the years 1946-1948 the percentage of formal complaints
handled by the shortened procedure with 31, 34, and 31. 61 ICC Ann. Rep.
79 (1948).
111. Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc. 405 (1941).
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could be supported by affidavits and other written evidence and
that the Administrator in his discretion might grant or deny the
protest in whole or in part or give notice of oral hearing.112 The
regulations provided that opportunity for oral hearing and cross-
examination would be allowed only upon a showing by a protestant
that the filing of written evidence would not permit the fair and ex-
peditious dispostion of the protest. The Emergency Court of Ap-
peals in 1943 rejected broadside contentions that this procedure
violated due process, 113 and the Supreme Court in the Yakus
case1 14 held that "the authorized procedure is not incapable of
affording the protection to petitioners' rights required by due
process. . . . In advance of application to the Administrator for
such a hearing we cannot well say whether its denial in any par-
ticular case would be a denial of due process." 115 Under this hold-
ing the denial of oral hearing might in some cases be constitutional
and in others unconstitutional. The problem was thereafter pre-
sented to the Emergency Court of Appeals in at least seven cases,
in all of which some means was contrived to avoid passing upon
the crucial issue of what circumstances require oral hearing.
The grounds for decision included failure to request an oral hear-
ing,116 lack of showing that written evidence would not permit
fair and expeditious disposition,"' 7 failure to comply with the pro-
cedural regulation, s8 allowance of opportunity for oral hearing at
a later stage of the proceeding,"09 and failure to show that refusal
of an oral hearing was an abuse of discretion. 20
112. 56 Stat. 31 (1942), as amended, 58 Stat. 638 (1944), 50 U. S. C.
§923 (1946).
113. Taylor v. Brown, 137 F. 2d 654 (Em. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
320 U. S. 787 (1943).
114. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944).
115. Id. at 436.
116. Veillette v. Bowles, 150 F. 2d 862 (Em. Ct. App. 1945).
117. Philips v. Porter, 157 F. 2d 607 (Em. Ct. App. 1946) ; Horns v.
Bowles, 151 F. 2d 191 (Em. Ct. App. 1945). In neither of these cases did
the court in its opinion indicate what showing was made or what showing
would be necessary.
118. Direct Realty Co. v. Porter, 157 F. 2d 434 (Em. Ct. App. 1946).
This case was aggravated by the fact that the complainant was misled by
the administrative officers as to his procedural rights. The court met this
objection by saying merely that the complainant failed to consult the regu-
lations, Id. at 438. The court acknowledged: "Procedural due process un-
doubtedly requires that a hearing be accorded at some stage of an administra-
tive proceeding." Id. at 439. But that right was held to be forfeited.
119. 150 East 47th Street Corp. v. Creedon, 162 F. 2d 206 (Em. Ct. App.
1947) ; Polis v. Creedon, 162 F. 2d 908 (Em. Ct. App. 1947).
120. Mortgage Underwriting & R. Co. v. Bowles, 150 2d 411 (Em.
Ct. App. 1945). The court said merely: "This Court will only interfere with
a decision of the Administrator in the matter of granting or refusing an oral
hearing where it plainly appears there has been an abuse of discretion. We
find no such abuse in this case."
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Despite the emergency element, the Yakus case and the various
Emergency Court of Appeals decisions seem to afford a fairly secure
foundation for the proposition that the ICC could constitutionally
make its shortened procedure compulsory for cases in which a
party cannot show a substantial dispute about a question of primary
fact. The ICC rules of practice concerning the "modified procedure"
seem to leave that question open. When parties refuse consent to
use the shortened procedure, memoranda of fact may nevertheless
be exchanged, and then any party desiring cross-examination may
apply for it, stating the basis for the application. The rule then
provides: "The order setting the complaint for oral hearing, if
hearing is deemed necessary, will specify the matters upon which
the parties are not in agreement and respecting which oral evidence
is to be introduced."''
SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE
The administrative process is providing an effective leadership
for reform of evidence practices. The American Law Institute's
decision against restating the law of evidence and in favor of re-
forming it through the proposed Model Code rested upon virtual
unanimity of evidence scholars in disapproving the exclusionary
rules. The Model Code, even though it has failed to win legislative
adoption, has nevertheless been a significant force for reform. But
it is the administrative process that is demonstrating through ex-
tensive experience the practical success of receiving "any oral or
documentary evidence" and of giving it such probative weight as
the finder of fact thinks it deserves in the particular record. The
achievements of the administrative process are sharpening the dis-
satisfaction with intricate rules that require exclusion of evidence
having substantial probative effect. More and more, the exclu-
sionary rules are attributed to the jury system. More and more, the
courts are asserting the need for confining the exclusionary rules
to jury cases. The Courts of Appeals of the Second and the Eighth
Circuits' 2 2 have been especially aggressive in encouraging district
judges to avoid the exclusion of evidence that might have sub-
stantial probative effect. A district court specifically imitates the
Federal Trade Commission in a nonjury case. Scattered case law
supports even the judicial reversal of administrative refusal to rely
upon legally incompetent evidence. 2 3
121. ICC Rules of Prac., Rule 53(b) (1942).
122. See notes 15, 22, 23 supra.
123. See notes 37, 40 supra.
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The technical rules are rejected not only as rules of exclusion
but also as rules to guide the process of fact finding. The transi-
tion idea of "a residuum of legal evidence," including even the
Supreme Court's generalization that "mere uncorroborated hear-
say" is not substantial evidence, cannot survive, and is already
rejected by many holdings. Of course, mere uncorroborated hear-
say is often insubstantial. But technically incompetent evidence is
often more reliable than technically competent evidence; several
items of incompetent evidence sometimes corroborate each other.
The problem is one for particular judgment in the light of a whole
record, not for abstract dogmatism. The hearsay rule, as well as any
generalization founded upon it, is deficient in leaving out of account
what a court of appeals has called "persuasive hearsay." 124 Respon-
sible persons often rely upon hearsay in serious affairs, just as
responsible persons often refuse to rely upon hearsay in serious
affairs. Appraising isolated bits of evidence apart from their
record contexts has always been unsound; questions of reliability
must be determined in the light of whole records and not in the
abstract.
Whether or not evidence is "reliable, probative, and substantial"
depends largely on factors having nothing to do with the reasons
behind the rules of competence. The practical effect of the particular
finding is often a major consideration. Revoking a license may
require more reliable evidence than granting a license. Evidence
which adequately supports an award of a benefit or even a cease
and desist order may be insufficient to support a severe penalty.
The Supreme Court emphasized in 1948 that "of course rules which
bar certain types of evidence in criminal or quasi-criminal cases
are not controlling in proceedings like this, where the effect of
the Commission's order is not to punish or to fasten liability on
respondents for past conduct but to ban specific practices for the
future in accordance with the general mandate of Congress." 25
Instead of making an invariable demand for the most reliable evi-
dence, the administrative process must often match the importance
or unimportance of the subject matter against considerations of
economy. For determining small claims, the expense of travel and
even of depositions may necessitate reliance on affidavits. But to
base revocation of a valuable license solely on an affidavit, when
expense is the only reason for not producing the witness, might
even be a denial of due process if opportunity for cross-examina-
124. Phelps Dodge R. Corp. v. FTC, 139 F. 2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1943).
125. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 705-06 (1948).
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tion is crucial. Sometimes precision is required; sometimes approxi-
mations are enough. The Supreme Court has often upheld the
ICC's "typical-evidence" practices: "To require specific evidence,
and separate adjudication, in respect to each division of each rate
of each carrier, would be tantamount to denying the possibility of
granting relief.' 120
A most encouraging consequence of the system of receiving "any
oral or documentary evidence" has been the sharp decline in litiga-
tion of evidence questions in the reviewing courts. The artificialities
of the technical rules have long been fertile breeders of unnecessary
litigation. Attention is at last focused on the significant problems-
the problems of probative value. And those problems are solved
and should be solved through exercise of discretion, not through
detailed rules.
126. New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, 197-98 (1923). See
also 2 Sharfman, The ICC 376-80 (1931); Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc.
19 (ICC Monograph 1941).
